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Criminal Law and Procedure.  State v. Parrillo, 228 A.3d 613 
(R.I. 2020).  A trial justice has the ability in a criminal, jury-waived 
trial to clarify theories of liability, disregard far-fetched testimony, 
and draw reasonable inferences from testimony and circumstantial 
evidence.  Per the raise-or-waive rule, if a defendant has concerns 
regarding a trial justice’s impartiality, these concerns must be 
raised at the trial court level in order to preserve the issue on 
appeal. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In December 2011, complainants, Jacob Fernandes 
(Fernandes) and his wife, Sumiya Majeed (Majeed), were assaulted 
by bouncers and the owner of Club 295 in Providence.1  The incident 
unfolded when Majeed needed to use the restroom and Paul Vargas 
(Vargas), the husband of one of Majeed’s coworkers who was 
familiar with the layout of Club 295, pointed Majeed to the 
restroom.2  At Majeed’s request, Fernandes met her at the restroom 
to hold the door closed as it could not be secured from the inside.3  
Vargas, who testified at trial, said that after pointing Majeed to the 
restroom he noticed one of the bouncers of the club (Tomas 
Robinson, principal assailant) putting Fernandes in a chokehold 
and pulling him toward the patio of the club with Majeed following.4  
The owner of the club, Anthony Parrillo (Defendant), instructed the 
bouncers to take Fernandes outside saying, “[n]ot right now. 
There’s too many people.  We will get him later.”5  Once outside, 
two bouncers pinned Fernandes’s arms behind his back and 
repeatedly hit Fernandes in the face, head, and body while the 
Defendant held Majeed back from intervening.6  Fernandes fell to 
1. State v. Parrillo, 228 A.3d 613, 615 (R.I. 2020).
2. Id. at 616.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 617.
5. Id. at 619.
6. Id. at 618.
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the ground and Majeed freed herself from Defendant and fell on top 
of him to cover him while both bouncers continued to kick the 
couple.7  Fernandes suffered serious injuries, including an orbital 
fracture and dental injuries that required hospitalization and 
surgery.8 
Detective Michael Otrando of the Providence Police 
Department obtained a formal written statement from Vargas 
detailing the event, showed Fernandes an array of photographs in 
which Fernandes identified the Defendant as one of the individuals 
involved in the assault, and later conducted a formal recorded 
interview of the Defendant.9  Detective Otrando concluded that the 
Defendant took part in the assault on Majeed and conspired with 
others to assault Fernandes and, “according to evidence, [the 
Defendant] was present [at the scene] and directing his 
employees.”10 
A criminal information was filed against the Defendant in 
Providence County Superior Court, charging him with conspiracy 
(which was later dismissed),11 one count of felony assault upon 
Fernandes, and one count of simple assault upon Majeed.12  The 
defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty and then waived 
his right to a jury trial.13  Trial commenced on April 28, 2015.14  The 
Defendant moved to dismiss after the State rested its case, citing 
insufficient evidence to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and a hearing on this motion to dismiss was held on May 7 
and 8, 2015.15  On November 2, 2015, the court heard arguments 
7. Id.
8. Id. at 615.
9. Id. at 618–19.
10. Id. at 619.
11. Id. at 620 (Defendant’s motion to dismiss the conspiracy count was
granted as the trial justice determined that standing alone, the plea of Tomas 
Robinson, a bouncer and principal assailant, did not establish a conspiracy).  
12. Id. at 616, 619 n.11 (detailing the merger of count one, felony assault
upon Fernandes, with serious injury resulting, and count two, assault upon 
Fernandes with a dangerous weapon into one charge, felony assault, as the two 
charges were part of the same continuing transaction). 
13. Id. at 616.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 619–21 (the trial justice denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the felony assault and simple assault counts but allowed Defendant to reargue 
the issue of dismissal as an error of law). 
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on Defendant’s remaining charges of felony assault with serious 
bodily injury on Fernandes and simple assault on Majeed, and 
again, Defendant moved to dismiss.16  
In regard to Defendant’s simple assault charge upon Majeed, 
the Defendant called William DeQuattro (DeQuattro), who was 
friends with Defendant and at the club the evening of the incident, 
to testify at the trial.17  DeQuattro testified that Defendant held 
Majeed, not to hold her back from her husband, but to comfort her.18  
In light of DeQuattro’s testimony, Defendant argued that the trial 
justice would be inappropriately pyramiding inferences if they 
found Defendant was holding back Majeed to prevent the violence 
against her husband as there were two equally justifiable 
inferences that could be drawn, and when there is an inference of 
guilt and an inference of innocence, an inference in favor of 
innocence must be drawn.19  The trial justice was not persuaded by 
Defendant’s arguments regarding the inappropriate pyramiding of 
inferences and found that given her husband was being beaten, 
Majeed was not being voluntarily held back and there was enough 
evidence for the court to find the Defendant as a principal in a 
simple assault on Majeed.20   
Further, in regard to the simple assault charge, the State also 
noted that the charge was sustained under a theory of aiding and 
abetting, which was included in the criminal information and 
pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 11-1-3.21  When the 
trial justice inquired as to whether the State was arguing aiding 
and abetting in regard to the other counts, the State said they did 
not believe they had the ability to do so as Defendant was not 
charged under the aforementioned statute in regard to the other 
counts.22  The court gave the State a brief recess before it made 
final arguments on whether the aiding and abetting statute could 
be applied to Defendant in regard to the other counts as it was not 
16. Id. at 622.
17. Id. at 621.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 622.
20. Id. at 622–23 (the State, however, argued that the totality of circum-
stances pointed to the fact that the Defendant held Majeed while her husband 
was beaten by Defendant’s employees to prevent her from interfering). 
21. Id. at 619–20 (citing 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-3 (1956)).
22. Id. at 619.
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specifically cited in the criminal information.23  After the recess, 
the State also argued aiding and abetting in regard to the other 
charges, stating that in order to use the theory, it need not be set 
forth in the criminal information and does not require proof of an 
additional element.24  Defendant argued that advancing an aiding 
and abetting theory was prejudicial.25 
The trial justice determined that the State advancing the 
theory of aiding and abetting did not constitute a new charge, was 
not prejudicial, and as such, the trial justice would consider the 
aiding and abetting theory for the felony assault charge.26  Further, 
the Defendant was afforded an opportunity after he rested his case 
to call witnesses to alleviate any perceived prejudice relating to the 
State’s advancement of the aiding and abetting theory later in the 
trial, but Defendant did not present any witnesses.27  Under the 
theory of aiding and abetting, the trial justice denied to dismiss the 
felony assault charge as there was a “community of unlawful 
purpose” and Defendant shared in the intent to inflict serious bodily 
injury on Fernandes.28 
Defendant also argued that had he known he would need to 
defend against an aiding and abetting theory, he may not have 
chosen to waive his right to a jury trial.29  However, the trial justice 
noted that there was an extensive conversation on record with the 
Defendant that the ultimate decision regarding a jury trial 
belonged to the Defendant.30   
In a bench decision, the trial justice ultimately found 
Defendant guilty as to both the felony assault and simple assault 
counts and denied Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss, 
sentencing Defendant to fifteen years of imprisonment.31  
23. Id. at 620.
24. Id. at 620 (citing State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642, 648 (R.I. 2005)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 621.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 622.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 623.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Defendant appealed, advancing four different arguments and 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court conducted a de novo review of the 
trial justice’s conclusions of law.32 
The Defendant’s first argument, was that he was deprived of 
his right to trial by a neutral and detached arbiter, contending that 
the trial justice coached the State to pursue an aiding and abetting 
theory.33  The Court rejected this argument as Defendant did not 
question the trial justice’s impartiality when it was appropriate to 
do so.34  Because Defendant knowingly waived his right to a jury 
trial, Defendant should have raised his concerns around the trial 
justice’s impartiality when the issue of aiding and abetting arose.35  
Additionally, Defendant was encouraged by the trial justice to 
research the issue of aiding and abetting when the trial justice 
granted the State a short recess to research the State’s uncertainty 
of pursuing the theory.36  If the Defendant had wanted to preserve 
the issue of the trial justice’s impartiality for appeal, the Defendant 
should have made a motion requesting the trial justice recuse 
himself after the theory of aiding and abetting was advanced.37  
Because Defendant did not question the trial justice’s impartiality 
at the appropriate time, pursuant to the raise-or-waive rule,38 the 
Defendant did not preserve this issue and could not raise an 
objection or advance a new theory on appeal that was not raised at 
the trial court.39   
In Defendant’s second argument, he contended that his 
conviction should be vacated as the pyramiding of inferences made 
from the State’s circumstantial evidence was speculative and as 
such, there was insufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a 
32. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. JS Pallet Co., 41 A.3d 978, 982 (R.I. 2012)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 624.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 624–25 (citing State v. Howard, 23 A.3d 1133, 1137–38 (R.I.
2011)). 
38. The raise-or-waive rule requires “a specific objection to preserve an is-
sue for appeal.”  Id. at 625 (citation omitted).  The Court requires “a specific 
objection so that the allegation of error can be brought to the attention of the 
trial justice, who will then have an opportunity to rule on it.”  Id. (quoting State 
v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013)).
39. Id.
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reasonable doubt on both convictions.40  However, the Court 
clarified that the State does not have to disprove every possible 
inference of innocence, “as long as the totality of the circumstantial 
evidence offered constitutes proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”41  Further, the Court explained that the pyramiding of 
inferences becomes speculative only when the initial inference in 
the pyramid rests upon an ambiguous fact that is equally capable 
of supporting guilt or innocence.42  Specifically, Defendant 
contended that based on DeQuattro’s testimony it could be equally 
inferred that Defendant was holding Majeed to comfort and protect 
her, and thus, it was improper of the trial justice to infer that 
Defendant was holding Majeed to prevent her from getting to her 
husband.43  The Court disagreed with Defendant’s argument 
stating that DeQuattro’s testimony was so inconsistent with 
testimony given by other witnesses as to border on being 
far-fetched, and as such, the trial justice was not wrong in his 
evaluation of the evidence in the case.44  Additionally, the Court 
determined the trial justice did not err as to an initial inference as 
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence at trial 
was consistent with guilt:  Defendant ordered his employees to take 
Fernandes to the location where the assault escalated and 
Defendant’s restraint of Majeed after directing his employees to 
take Fernandes to the back of the club was only consistent with the 
inference that he held Majeed to prevent her from interfering.45  As 
such, the Court determined that based on the evidence there was 
nothing speculative about the inferences drawn by the trial 
justice.46  
The Defendant’s third argument on appeal was that he was 
prejudiced by the lack of notice of the “charge” of aiding and 
abetting in regard to the felony assault charge and had there been 
timely notice, he may not have waived his right to a jury trial and 
may have conducted his cross-examination of the State’s witnesses 
40. Id.
41. Id. at 626 (quoting State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 581 (R.I. 1987)).
42. Id. (citing Caruolo, 524 A.2d at 582).
43. Id. at 627.
44. Id. at 628.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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differently.47  The Court rejected this argument as there was an 
extensive conversation with the trial justice that established that 
Defendant understood it was his decision, not his counsel’s, to waive 
a jury trial.48  Additionally, Defendant did not raise the issue of jury 
waiver until two months after the aiding and abetting theory was 
introduced.49  Further, the Court clarified that aiding and abetting 
is a theory of liability—not a separate charge or offense.50  Per 
State v. Davis, “one who aids and abets in the commission of a crime 
and is also present at the scene may be charged and convicted as a 
principal.”51  As such, Defendant’s argument that he was 
prejudiced by the separate “charge” of aiding and abetting is 
incorrect.52  Additionally, the Court noted that the Defendant could 
have sought a bill of particulars to clarify the State’s theories of 
guilt.53  Accordingly, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument 
regarding the prejudicial effect of the State’s aiding and abetting 
theory.54 
Lastly, the Court addressed Defendant’s final argument, that 
if none of the errors standing alone warrants reversal, the 
cumulative effect of the errors leads to reversible error, and thus, 
his conviction should be overturned.55  The Court dismissed this 
argument because the trial justice’s rulings were not erroneous, and 
therefore, the cumulative effect doctrine was not available to 
Defendant.56  As such, the Court rejected Defendant’s appeal and 
affirmed the judgement of the Superior Court.57 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reinforced the importance of 
timing during the trial court process in mitigating potential 
47. Id. at 629.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 629–30.




55. Id. at 630–31 (in his argument, Defendant relied on State v. Pepper,
237 A.2d 330 (R.I. 1968)). 
56. Id. at 631.
57. Id.
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prejudice and preserving a defendant’s arguments on appeal.  The 
Court acknowledged that, in the absence of clear error, trial justices 
have the power to inquire about theories of liability as well as 
possess the ultimate discretion in the admission and weight of 
evidence in a jury-waived trial. 
The Court discussed that because the Defendant did not raise 
the concern of the trial justice’s impartiality at the trial court level, 
thus preserving the issue for appeal, that the Court would abide by 
the “staunchly adhered” to raise-or-waive rule.58  In applying the 
raise-or-waive rule, the Court reinforced the purpose of the rule in 
maintaining judicial efficiency by preventing parties, like the 
Defendant, from litigating issues on appeal that could and should 
have been addressed at the trial court level.  While the raise-or-
waive rule recognizes exceptions for constitutional or novel areas of 
law, straying from this rule in cases such as this, where an 
exception is not established, could lead to continuous appeals that 
would overwhelm appellate courts and weaken the importance of 
the trial court process.   
Further, the Court reinforced the trial justice’s ability in a 
criminal case to evaluate evidence and determine inferences based 
on a totality of the circumstances.  A trial justice in a criminal case 
does not act erroneously when they do not accept implausible 
evidence or testimony that is inconsistent with guilt, as an 
inference that a defendant is innocent.  This also prevents the 
prosecution from the arduous process of disproving every possible 
far-fetched inference.  The Court’s acknowledgement that 
extremely implausible testimony does not disturb the trial justice’s 
ability to make appropriate inferences furthers the important 
purpose of judicial effectiveness and efficiency.  Were the trial 
justice to give equal weight to every possible inference of far-fetched 
testimony, a defendant could potentially call any witness willing to 
testify that the defendant acted inconsistently with guilt and the 
trial justice would have to dismiss the charge or, through the 
appeals process, the case would have to be reversed.  Given the 
potential harm that forcing trial justices to make improbable 
inferences would have on the integrity of the criminal justice 
process, the Court importantly recognized that a trial justice does 
not engage in an inappropriate pyramiding of inferences by 
58. Id. at 623, 625.
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disregarding absurd testimony and weighing the totality of 
evidence.   
Lastly, the Court also clarified that aiding and abetting is not 
a separate charge, but a theory of liability under Rhode Island law, 
and a defendant is not prejudiced by the introduction of this theory 
in a criminal, jury-waived trial.59  Perhaps more importantly, the 
Court acknowledged the ability of defendants to mitigate the 
possible surprise of defending against an aiding and abetting theory 
through requesting a bill of particulars.60  In acknowledging 
Defendant’s ability to utilize judicial tools available to him at the 
trial court level, the Court echoed the importance of zealously 
engaging in the trial court process to encourage the diligence of 
counsel and promote the efficiency of the criminal justice system as 
a whole.   
CONCLUSION 
In holding that in order to preserve the issue of a trial justice’s 
impartiality for appeal, a defendant must raise this concern at the 
trial court level, the Rhode Island Supreme Court strongly 
recognized the importance of criminal defendants utilizing the trial 
court process efficiently.  Further, aiding and abetting is a theory 
of liability, not a separate charge, and an improper pyramiding of 
inferences is not established by a trial justice’s decision to disregard 
far-fetched witness testimony.  The Court’s decision further 
established the autonomy of trial justices in drawing inferences and 
clarifying theories as well as the importance of using the trial court 
process efficiently to preserve future issues for appeal. 
 Sheya Rivard 
59. Id. at 629–30; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-3 (1956).
60. Id. at 630.
